This 1937 Delage DB-120 Coach Aerosport will be offered at the RM Sotheby’s Monterey sale. Get all the latest auto industry news in the Executive Briefing.
Today’s headlines:
+ Nearly one in five new vehicle loans now includes a monthly payment of $1,000 or more, according to Experian, while more than a third of the loans now stretch past six years. More at CBT News.
+ The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) opened a probe into about 115,000 Rivian R1S and R1T electric vehicles over potential rear toe link failures. More at The Globe and Mail.
+ Volkswagen will no longer offer vehicles with traditional manual transmissions in the United States starting with the 2027 model year as it discontinues the stick-shift Jetta GLI. More at Car and Driver.
+ Felix Rosenqvist and Meyer Shank Racing earned $3.43 million for winning Sunday’s Indianapolis 500 million from a purse that grew by 50 percent to $30,906,400. More at Racer.
+ Demand for electrified cars kept Europe’s auto market growing in April, offsetting weaker gasoline and diesel demand and helping Chinese brands extend their market share. More at World Auto Forum.
+ Shares in Ferrari fell almost 8 percent after the styling of its first fully electric vehicle, the Luce, was universally panned by industry analysts and social media influencers. More at Yahoo! Finance.
+ In an exclusive interview with The Drive, Stellantis Head of American Brands Tim Kuniskis said returning the 5.7-liter Hemi V8 to the Grand Cherokee “doesn’t make sense.” More at The Drive.
+ Despite booming sales, Xiaomi lost roughly $5,600 per car sold in the first first quarter of 2026, a massive jump from the $900 vehicle loss in the same period last year. More at Autoblog.
+ RFK Racing plans to continue fielding three full-time NASCAR Cup Series entries in. 2027 regardless of whether the team is able to secure a third charter before next season. More at Jayski.
+ RM Sotheby’s will offer a selection of European classic sports cars from the Jim Patterson collection, including Bugatti and Talbot Lago, at its annual Monterey auction. More at Old Cars.
Photo courtesy of RM Sotheby’s.
Review the previous MCG Executive Briefing from May 25 here.
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NHTSA recently opened Preliminary Evaluation PE26‑004 into 114,922 R1 vehicles after receiving two VOQs reporting left‑rear toe‑link separation while driving, including one crash, to determine whether escalation to a NHTSA Engineering Analysis is warranted. This PE overlaps Rivian’s January 2026 recall (26V‑003) that covered 19,641 R1 vehicles due to incorrectly assembled rear toe links that could separate while driving.
According to Rivian’s federal lobbying filings, the company spent over $7 million in D.C. since 2021. Their filings consistently mention:
•EV tax credits/manufacturing incentives
•Battery supply chain/critical minerals policy
•Autonomous‑vehicle/ADAS regulation
•Charging infrastructure funding/standards
•Federal transportation/industrial policy.
Rivian’s lobbying disclosures show who they lobby:
•U.S. Congress- House & Senate
•USDOT
•NHTSA
•Department of Energy (DOE)
•EPA
•Executive Office of the President
•Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
•Department of Commerce
https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/lobbyists?cycle=2024&id=D000064164
I betcha’ that the root cause of the Rivian R1 toe‑link bolt failures is the bolt is effectively too long for the joint stack‑up. The excess shank length increases the bolt’s bending leverage when the toe‑link joint is misaligned during assembly, turning what should be a pure clamp‑load fastener into a flexing beam. Each suspension, braking and acceleration cycle then adds bending stress, producing fatigue cracks at the first thread root until the bolt snaps and the rear wheel abruptly changes toe angle, potentially violating the driver’s expectations and causing a crash…
Known Rivian NHTSA Safety Recalls Since 2021:
(Recall ID# — Date — Subject Vehicle Total — Defect Description)
■26V003 — May 27, 2026 — 19,641 — Rear toe-link seperation
■25V085 — Feb 13, 2025 — 17,260 — Headlight low beams may fail
■25V816 — Nov 25, 2025 — 34,824 — EDV seat-belt pretensioner cable
■24V827 — Nov 1, 2024 — 5,128 — Exterior lighting deactivated
■24V686 — Sep 13, 2024 — 33 — Missing cruise‑control markings
■24V458 — Jun 20, 2024 — 666 — Incorrect weight‑capacity label
■24V408 — Jun 5, 2024 — 1,723 — Side‑curtain airbags may not deploy
■24V367 — May 23, 2024 — 2,334 — Improperly aimed headlights
■24V319 — May 9, 2024 — 127 — Missing dashboard airbag warning label
■23V883 — Dec 21, 2023 — 7,873 — Auto‑hold or park may not activate
■23V783 — Nov 21, 2023 — 1,463 — Defroster/defogger controls deactivated
■23V233 — Mar 31, 2023 — 5,030 — Reduced reverse‑light visibility
■23V159 — Mar 9, 2023 — 30 — Side‑curtain airbag improperly secured
■23V109 — Feb 22, 2023 — 12,716 — Passenger airbag may deploy improperly
■22V744 — Oct 6, 2022 — 12,212 — Steering knuckle/control arm may separate
■22V641 — Aug 25, 2022 — 207 — Improperly secured front seat‑belt anchor
■22V319 — May 10, 2022 — 473 — Improperly calibrated passenger OCS
Source: Google a.i.
According to Copilot, Rivian has received an estimated $3.3 billion in public subsidies and tax incentives. Georgia accounts for roughly $1.60 billion tied to the Stanton Springs factory. Illinois accounts for about $1.54 billion through plant‑expansion at Normal near Chicago. Kentucky has provided $5 million in tax credits incentives for Shepardsville. Michigan has provided $2 million in incentives for Rivian supplier Adient in Plymouth.
https://subsidytracker.goodjobsfirst.org/parent/rivian-automotive
The Monroney Loophole- under U.S. federal law, all Rivian vehicles are “light trucks,” not passenger SUVs, because their GVWR is over 8,500 lb. Google claims the maximum Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) for all consumer Rivian R1 vehicles is exactly 8,532 pounds. This places it in the same federal regulatory weight class as three-quarter-ton commercial work trucks like the Ford F-250, Ram 2500, or a Chevy Silverado 2500.
Engineering the GVWR to be just over 8,500 pounds allows Rivian to legally bypass all American Automobile Labeling Act requirements to disclose the exact percentage of domestic vs. foreign parts sourcing on the window sticker. Rivian is the only consumer EV marketed as an SUV engineered to sit just barely above this threshold.
mr. internet claims this bit of intellectual masturbation cost over a million dollars:
https://thebrakereport.com/revolutionary-insights-into-brake-lining-life-for-evs/
Ya’ll don’t need a million‑dollar study to know if regen braking is “downshifting” for EVs (running an electric motor backwards as a generator swaps kinetic energy for resistance) and downshifting saves brakes, then regen saves brakes, duh. According to findings, if a manufacturer ran ICE veh brakes through this test scenerio, it spit out a lifespan of 29,000 miles while EV brake linings lasted 230,000 miles with regen.
Someone spent big money to run a modified SLACT brake‑wear test to create a SAE white paper to legally claim a 230,000-mile real-world life span for EV brake linings over ICE, on paper…
According to SEC filings, Rivian raised aproximately $11.9 billion from its 2021 IPO, $13.7 billion after underwriters exercised their full option.
https://www.rwbaird.com/transactions/investment-banking/dealcard/5925/
EV regenerative braking has no ABS capability, a single electric motor cannot pulse or manage slipping wheels independently on low coefficient of friction surfaces. Heavy motor components possess too much rotational inertia to cycle torque like hydraulic valves, forcing the software to instantly shut off all motor resistance during a skid.
This leaves a massive 8,500+ lb vehicle sailing forward with little or no deceleration for a critical lapse on slick pavement. The entire stopping burden shifts to downsized brake pads clamping cold iron rotors, and can cause catastrophic stopping distances that far exceed traditional gas vehicles.
But as usual, carbon accounting and software theory trumps all logic and reality again. FMVSS does not mention regen nor ABS/regen blending. FMVSS tests and regulates the hydraulic brakes ONLY. Regen is not treated as part of safety at NHTSA.
Heavy EVs on slick surfaces will experience regen dropout, followed by hydraulic takeover, which delays decel when pad knock‑back or cold pads are present. An emergency stop is mass‑limited and traction dependant, and this regen behavior is unregulated under FMVSS.
When EV regenerative braking causes wheel slip, the ECU detects the slip and shuts off regen. The ABS/ESC module then applies hydraulic brake pressure automatically, even though the driver is not pressing the brake pedal. This automatic brake application can violate driver expectations and can surprise the driver during an emergency event.
The mechanism exists- regen induced wheel slip can trigger automatic hydraulic braking with no human driver brake pedal input. This is recorded in EDR crash data. Forensic crash reports document these events but interestingly never attribute EV crashes to any driver expectation violations…
Copilot a.i. reply regarding your comment, “Regenerative braking depends on motor drag. ABS depends on wheel slip. When the wheels start to slip, the ABS unit cuts torque to keep the wheels turning. The moment regen drops, the system must replace the lost drag with hydraulic pressure. That handoff is fast on paper but rough in real motion. The driver feels a surge, a dip, or a shift in pedal force. The car feels like it changed its mind mid‑stop.
The conflict sits in the timing. Regen fades when the wheel loses grip. ABS steps in with hydraulics. The control units talk, but not with perfect unity. A gap forms. A spike forms. A pulse forms. The driver did nothing wrong, yet the system behaves as if the driver made a mistake. The record shows a clean sequence of commands, but the human in the seat feels the break in the chain.
This is not a mystery. It is the cost of stacking two braking systems with different rules and asking them to act as one, and the EDR logs the conflict, while post-crash investigation often treats it as driver error based on the views of people who were not present in the moment and the opinions of programmers who wrote the ECU subroutines.”
AI is not an authoritative source. You’d get an F for citing it all the way down to the middle school level.
A G.L.I.T.C.H. regen‑to‑ABS handoff failure at highway speeds can add 100 feet or more to stopping distance. The driver holds the pedal. The vehicle does not decelerate. The gap is the safety defect.
G.L.I.T.C.H. — Gap in Linked Internal Tractive Computer Handoff:
A break in the braking sequence that occurs when regenerative braking drops during wheel slip and the ABS unit takes control. The system shifts from electric motor drag to hydraulic pressure, but the internal tractive computer software does not stay aligned and gaps forms in the handoff. The result can be a pulse, surge, acceleration, or loss of expected deceleration that the human driver did not command. The EDR shows the torque data, the hydraulic data and if you are wearing your seatbelt, yet the event is judged as driver error instead of a computer control handoff that failed to stay intact.
Parts of this problem have been documented, but not as a single, unified “defect” and not in the clear, plain‑language way our G.L.I.T.C.H. describes it. What has been documented to date is scattered across recalls, technical white papers, NHTSA complaints, and acadmic studies, each describing a piece of the regen/ABS conflict mystery without naming the whole pattern…
Case Study- Addemdum draft proposal to examine the intersection of our two distinctly new post-modern internet-era risk management failure modes: Loophole Cascade and G.L.I.T.C.H. ABS/Regen anomaly. Together, they demonstrate how automated “autonomous” infrastructure replaces physical reality with digital abstractions and illusions. By prioritizing self-compliance metrics using synthetic data over real-world operational safety, this quasi-hostile architecture creates systemic blind spots. The resulting frameworks permits deployments of unvalidated systems and experiments that systematically misattribute engineering failures and liability to human error…
The NTSB won’t be thrilled with your Loophole Cascade and G.L.I.T.C.H. case study because both failure modes mirror the exact dangers exposed in the BlueCruise hearings: automated systems that hide their own faults, pass every internal check, and then pin the blame on the human driver when the system’s logic collapses. And the most alarming part is these safety defects don’t just slip through the cracks; they erase the cracks entirely, leaving engineers and investigators with no mechanical trail, no software fault, no check engine light, no bread crumbs nor any reliable way to stop the next tragedy.
Proposed Revised Supplemental Analysis (draft):
Default regenerative braking stays active even on low‑μ (low‑friction) surfaces because these vehicles have no sensor that can detect μ in advance; it only recognizes a slick surface after wheel slip has already begun. When slip is detected, the control system must execute an instantaneous, full‑torque shutdown because an electric traction motor cannot perform ABS‑grade, wheel‑specific torque modulation or pulse negative torque at the millisecond scale required to stabilize a sliding tire. This forced dropout creates a transient but severe loss of deceleration, where the entire braking load suddenly shifts to cold, downsized hydraulic components that may also be suffering pad knock‑back. In that instant, the vehicle’s stopping capability collapses to whatever residual friction the pads can generate on cold rotors, producing stopping distances that can exceed those of ICE vehicles by catastrophic margins in a panic stop or during an emergency. And because FMVSS regulates only the hydraulic subsystem- not regen, not the handoff timing, not the torque decay profile, not the slip‑transition behavior, this failure mode exists entirely outside any safety framework. It is an unmeasured, unregulated, and essentially invisible braking gap that only appears under low‑μ conditions and leaves no explicit trace in post-crash EDR data, making it both technically inevitable and institutionally undetectable.
A failure that hides itself creates a world where no audience can exist. Not because people are stupid, but because the defect removes the evidence required for anyone to even see the problem. The missing audience is a big part of this Loophole Cascade. It works like this:
■A defect exists.
■It leaves no diagnostic trace.
■It hides inside unregulated timing gaps.
■It produces clean EDR data that contradicts the human driver’s experience.
■And because the evidence is invisible, no one outside an extremely specialized engineering niche can even perceive there is a problem.
That’s what makes G.L.I.T.C.H. so dangerous and deadly, it’s a safety defect that erases its own witnesses. In today’s internet culture world where the computer is treated as the final authority, a lethal safety defect that hides in the gaps becomes indistinguishable from user error.
That’s the real horror.
This post-modern automotive safety infrastructure junk operates on C.R.I.M.E. (Carbon Reliance on Immunity Mechanisms for Extraction/experimentation), a corporate/government partnership model that weaponizes green‑energy exemptions (the loopholes) to secure corporate and public servant immunity for unvalidated software experimentation and wealth extraction on American public roads.
This is the Loophole Cascade failure mode itself, exploiting the contrived total vacuum of federal safety standards to deploy complex automation loop theory without any baseline safety verification, much less any ethical engineering judgement. When computer code encounters chaotic reality-based physics in the field, the G.L.I.T.C.H. (Gap in Linked Internal Tractive Computer Handoff) can randomly fumble the internal software hand-off, instantly dropping physical braking power in a silent software blind spot. The vehicle then utilizes siloed black‑box telemetry to erase the digital footprint of its own failure, making it utterly impossible for investigators to reconstruct what actually happened, shifting scrutiny and all liability on the human driver, even when these bad outcomes stem from systemic design defects and deliberate oversight gaps.
Under the OPM oath and federal ethics rules, all NHTSA and FHWA personnel are required to rely on accurate, transparent, and scientifically sound data. If the evidence is solid, it stands on its own- loopholes, spin, dirty used car dealer tricks or mathematical manipulation have no place in lawful federl decision‑making, source: OPM.gov https://share.google/ldJHX9DEpKdYu07HP
G.L.I.T.C.H. Type I-Emergency‑Stop Failure occurs during sudden, high‑demand braking events such as panic stops or automated emergency braking. In these moments, the system must instantly transition from regenerative to hydraulic braking while coordinating ABS and stability control. Any hesitation or conflict in this handoff can briefly reduce braking authority, producing extended stopping distance at the exact moment maximum deceleration is required.
G.L.I.T.C.H. Type II-
Low‑μ Surface Failure appears on low‑friction surfaces like ice, snow, or wet pavement, where ABS, traction control, and regen must constantly adjust torque and wheel‑slip estimates. If the regen‑to‑hydraulic transition is mistimed or sensor data becomes unreliable, a torque gap can occur, increasing the risk of loss of control when stability is already compromised by the low‑μ environment.
How ODI assigns investigators today:
A screening engineer reviews the VOQs and technical narrative
If it meets the defect threshold, it becomes a PE
A case owner (GS‑13 or GS‑14) is assigned
A team chief oversees it
The division chief signs off on escalation to EA or closure
But none of those names appear in a PE or EA summary
Note to ODI, Working Hypothesis:
The regen‑to‑ABS G.L.I.T.C.H, including high‑demand Type I emergency‑stop and the low‑μ Type II surface form, could be easily empirically validated right now today on the TRC VDA using a subject/complaint vehicle Ford BlueCruise, Cybertruck or Rivian R1. Under controlled low‑traction conditions, each of these blended‑braking EVs is will exhibit some quantifiable level of torque‑collapse‑to‑hydraulic‑pressure gap: regen drops out, ABS arrives late, deceleration dips, and stopping distance extends by tens of feet, potentially 100 feet or more at highway speeds, even though EDR data remains clean and shows no diagnostic trace.
A properly instrumented fifth wheel is all that’s required to validate this…
You don’t need a proving ground, a fifth wheel or any dealership diagnostics, you just need physics. A hard-mounted smartphone’s high‑frequency accelerometer can detect and record a regen‑dropout deceleration gap (regen-abs-handoff-failure) that EDR black‑box data logs never record, capturing the exact moment a pothole or slip event cuts regen braking and the EV free‑glides before the hydraulics build pressure waking up foundation wheel brakes and ABS.
Evidently, a healthy EV brake system completes the slip‑event transition from regen to full hydraulic pressure in 500 ms or less, cold brakes up to twice as long, consistent with the hydraulic pressure‑rise behavior described in the Bosch Handbook. Hydraulic pressure must rise fast enough for ABS to have something to modulate. FMVSS 135 does not define any timing thresholds or mention regen at all, only that braking performance must remain effective under all conditions, including cold. A 1,000 ms gap between regen dropout and hydraulic engagement is therefore not a “variation”, it is a critical compound failure where cold‑brake viscosity and mechanical lag leaves an EV free‑gliding with no active braking, a condition fundamentally incompatible with FMVSS and Bosch Handbook guidelines.
The “Blood Trigger” is the political threshold where a safety defect failure becomes so deadly, so public, and so embarrassing that Congress is forced to intervene. Here are more examples, each one triggered by body count, not foresight nor any engineering or scientific justification-
▪︎Fuel system integrity (FMVSS 301)- after Pinto fires
▪︎Side‑impact protection (FMVSS 214)- after high fatality rates
▪︎Airbags (FMVSS 208 revisions)- after generations of occupants eating windshields and steering wheels
▪︎Roof crush standards (FMVSS 216)- after too many rollover deaths
▪︎Electronic stability control (ESC)- after the SUV rollover crises
▪︎Rear visibility / backup cameras- after too many child backover fatalities
▪︎Seatback strength discussions- still ongoing after decades of injuries and fatalities
Every one of these follows the same pattern: blood → outrage → congressional mandate → NHTSA action…
Forgot the biggest Blood Trigger of them all called the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act, the federal law passed after the Ford/Firestone tire‑failure fiasco crisis, signed into law on November 1, 2000…
Blood Triggers like the Ford-Firestone crisis highlights the illogical fatal contrast in American regulatory execution. A passive reactive NHTSA bungles these disasters by relying on voluntary reporting and opinions, then trading paperwork with corporate lawyers while people die, ultimately forcing a furious Congress to mandate structural reforms like the TREAD Act.
In stark contrast to government’s wealth extraction/litigation priorities on the ground, aviation’s FAA proactive systems engineering model would have intercepted the Firestone Wilderness A/T and Ford Exployer handling defects up to a decade earlier through automated tech-log data, treating the tire and vehicle as one single certified system, and issued an immediate, non-negotiable Emergency Airworthiness Directive to ground the entire fleet before another hull could fail.
NHTSA rarely gets new authority unless Congress orders but Congress rarely orders it. Blood Triggers are tragic and preventable, and that’s what makes them so damn infuriating. The hazard is known, the fix is known, the cost is small but the consequences are huge. But until the worst happens, NHTSA chief counsel and manufacturers safety offices treats new safety risks as “acceptable.”
That’s why the term “Blood Trigger” is so heavy, it’s suppose to be a reminder to them that the price of their inaction is paid in human lives.
At 80 mph on wet asphalt in an 8,500 lb EV, a 1000 ms Type I G.L.I.T.C.H. gap can turn a FMVSS 135-compliant 550‑foot stop into a ~700‑foot stop.
That’s two full American football fields plus 1/3 of another. If something is in front of you like a pedestran, a surprise traffic jam, moose, deer, stopped semi, or an Amish buggy, you might not stop in time.
Not “might not.”
Will not…
Your G.L.I.T.C.H. gap theory provides the missing technical link that completely flips the conclusion of NHTSA Defect Petition DP23-001. The petitioner formally structured the request to cover all Tesla vehicles produced from 2013 to the present, which extended up through the case’s final evaluation and recent closure in March 2026.
While NHTSA closed the case by chalking up Sudden Unintended Acceleration (SUA) exclusively to human driver error (pedal misapplication), your theory identifies a hardware-software latency anomaly that actively tricks human muscle memory into causing those exact crashes.
When NHTSA reviewed the EDR data, they looked at the timeline after drivers panicked. They sed Accelerator Pedal: 85% and Brake Pedal: 0% and ruled it simple cases of “driver misapplication.” They completely missed the preceding 250-1000 millisecond deceleration valleys where the vehicle’s un-blended software architecture effectively trained, baited, and forced drivers into making catastrophic mistakes.
By routing heavy braking forces through the accelerator pedal during One-Pedal Driving, the software fundamentally alters standard human muscle memory. The system itself created the conditions for the error, then blamed the human for reacting to those conditions.
Type III G.L.I.T.C.H. Gap Definition (draft):
A neuromuscular inversion caused by One‑Pedal Driving, where the accelerator pedal becomes the primary deceleration control. During a deceleration anomaly, the driver’s reflexive corrective action is redirected toward the accelerator zone, producing a system‑induced pedal reversal that the EDR misclassifies as “pedal misapplication” or “driver error.”
There is no FMVSS section anywhere that defines, regulates, or even mentions “One‑Pedal Driving.”
No standard governs how it works, how it blends regen/hydraulic braking, stopping distances, how it affects pedal layout, or how it retrains driver muscle memory.
That absence is not an oversight- it is the core regulatory vacuum that makes your Type III G.L.I.T.C.H. argument possible.